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Abstract
In this paper, we consider a scenario where a source node wishes to broadcast two confidential messages for two respective
receivers, while a wire-tapper also receives the transmitted signal. This model is motivated by wireless communications, where
individual secure messages are broadcast over open media and can be received by any illegitimate receiver. The secrecy level is
measured by equivocation rate at the eavesdropper. We first study the general (non-degraded) broadcast channel with confidential
messages. We present an inner bound on the secrecy capacity region for this model. The inner bound coding scheme is based
on a combination of random binning and the Gelfand-Pinsker bining. This scheme matches the Marton’s inner bound on the
broadcast channel without confidentiality constraint. We further study the situation where the channels are degraded. For the
degraded broadcast channel with confidential messages, we present the secrecy capacity region. Our achievable coding scheme
is based on Cover’s superposition scheme and random binning. We refer to this scheme as Secret Superposition Scheme. In this
scheme, we show that randomization in the first layer increases the secrecy rate of the second layer. This capacity region matches
the capacity region of the degraded broadcast channel without security constraint. It also matches the secrecy capacity for the
conventional wire-tap channel. Our converse proof is based on a combination of the converse proof of the conventional degraded
broadcast channel and Csiszar lemma. Finally, we assume that the channels are Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) and
show that secret superposition scheme with Gaussian codebook is optimal. The converse proof is based on the generalized entropy
power inequality.
I. INTRODUCTION
The notion of information theoretic secrecy in communication systems was first introduced by Shannon in [1]. The information
theoretic secrecy requires that the received signal of the eavesdropper does not provide even a single bit information about
the transmitted messages. Shannon considered a pessimistic situation where both the intended receiver and the eavesdropper
have direct access to the transmitted signal (which is called ciphertext). Under these circumstances, he proved a negative result
showing that perfect secrecy can be achieved only when the entropy of the secret key is greater than or equal to the entropy
of the message. In modern cryptography, all practical cryptosystems are based on Shannnon’s pessimistic assumption. Due to
practical constraints, secret keys are much shorter than messages. Therefore, these practical cryptosystems are theoretically
susceptible of breaking by attackers. However, the goal of designing such practical ciphers is to guarantee that there exists no
efficient algorithm for breaking them.
Wyner in [2] showed that the above negative result is a consequence of Shannon’s restrictive assumption that the adversary
has access to precisely the same information as the legitimate receiver. Wyner considered a scenario in which a wire-tapper
receives the transmitted signal over a degraded channel with respect to the legitimate receiver’s channel. He further assumed
that the wire-tapper has no computational limitations and knows the codebook used by the transmitter. He measured the
level of ignorance at the eavesdropper by its equivocation and characterized the capacity-equivocation region. Interestingly, a
non-negative perfect secrecy capacity is always achievable for this scenario.
The secrecy capacity for the Gaussian wire-tap channel is characterized by Leung-Yan-Cheong in [3]. Wyner’s work then is
extended to the general (non-degraded) broadcast channel with confidential messages (BCC) by Csiszar and Korner [4]. They
considered transmitting confidential information to the legitimate receiver while transmitting common information to both the
legitimate receiver and the wire-tapper. They established a capacity-equivocation region of this channel.
The BCC is further studied recently in [5]–[7], where the source node transmits a common message for both receivers, along
with two additional confidential messages for two respective receivers. The fading BCC is investigated in [8], [9] where the
broadcast channels from the source node to the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper is corrupted by multiplicative fading
gain coefficients, in addition to additive white Gaussian noise terms. The Channel State Information (CSI) is assumed to be
known at the transmitter. In [10], the perfect secrecy capacity is derived where the channels are slow fading. Moreover, the
optimal power control policy is obtained for different scenarios regarding availability of CSI. In [11], the wire-tap channel is
extended to the parallel broadcast channels and the fading channels with multiple receivers. Here, the secrecy constraint is
a perfect equivocation for each messages, even if all the other messages are revealed to the eavesdropper. The secrecy sum
capacity for a reverse broadcast channel is derived for this restrictive assumption. The notion of the wire-tap channel is also
extended to multiple access channels [12]–[15], relay channels [16]–[19], parallel channels [20] and MIMO channels [21]–[26].
Some other related works on communication of confidential messages can be found in [27]–[31].
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Fig. 1. Broadcast Channel with Confidential Messages
In this paper, we consider a scenario where a source node wishes to broadcast two confidential messages for two respective
receivers, while a wire-tapper also receives the transmitted signal. This model is motivated by wireless communications, where
individual secure messages are broadcast over shared media and can be received by any illegitimate receiver. In fact, we simplify
the restrictive constraint imposed in [11] and assume that the eavesdropper does not have access to the other messages. We
first study the general broadcast channel with confidential messages. We present an achievable rate region for this channel.
Our achievable coding scheme is based on the combination of the random binning and the Gelfand-Pinsker bining [32]. This
scheme matches the Marton’s inner bound [33] on the broadcast channel without confidentiality constraint. We further study
the situation where the channels are physically degraded and characterize the secrecy capacity region. Our achievable coding
scheme is based on Cover’s superposition coding [34] and the random binning. We refer to this scheme as Secret Superposition
Coding. This capacity region matches the capacity region of the degraded broadcast channel without security constraint. It also
matches the secrecy capacity of the wire-tap channel.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II we introduce the system model. In Section III, we provide an
inner bound on the secrecy capacity region when the channels are not degraded. In section IV, we specialize our channel to
the physically degraded and establish the secrecy capacity region. In Section V, we conclude the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this paper, a random variable is denoted by a capital letter (e.g. X) and its realization is denoted by a corresponding lower
case letter (e.g. x). The finite alphabet of a random variable is denoted by a script letter (e.g. X ) and its probability distribution
is denoted by P (x). Let X be a finite alphabet set and denote its cardinality by |X |. The members of Xn will be written as
xn = (x1, x2, ..., xn), where subscripted letters denote the components and superscripted letters denote the vector. The notation
xi−1 denotes the vector (x1, x2, ..., xi−1). A similar notation will be used for random variables and random vectors.
Consider a Broadcast Channel with Confidential messages as depicted in fig.1. In this confidential setting, the transmitter
(X) wants to broadcast some secret messages to the legitimated receivers (Y1,Y2), and prevent the eavesdropper (Z) from
having any information about the messages. A discrete memoryless broadcast channel with confidential messages is described
by finite sets X , Y1,Y2,Z , and a conditional distribution P (y1, y2, z|x). The input of the channel is x ∈ X and the outputs
are (y1, y2, z) ∈ (Y1 × Y2 × Z) for receiver 1, receiver 2, and the eavesdropper, respectively. The transmitter wishes to send
independent messages (W1,W2) to the respective receivers in n uses of the channel while insuring perfect secrecy. The channel
is discrete memoryless in the sense that
P (yn1 , y
n
2 , z
n|xn) =
n∏
i=1
P (y1,i, y2,i, zi|xi). (1)
A ((2nR1 , 2nR2), n) code for a broadcast channel with confidential messages consists of a stochastic encoder
f : ({1, 2, ..., 2nR1} × {1, 2, ..., 2nR2})→ Xn, (2)
and two decoders,
g1 : Y
n
1 → {1, 2, ..., 2
nR1} (3)
and
g2 : Y
n
2 → {1, 2, ..., 2
nR2}. (4)
The average probability of error is defined as the probability that the decoded messages are not equal to the transmitted
messages; that is,
P (n)e = P (g1(Y
n
1 ) 6= W1 ∪ g2(Y
n
2 ) 6= W2). (5)
The knowledge that the eavesdropper gets about W1 and W2 from its received signal Zn is modeled as
I(Zn,W1) = H(W1)−H(W1|Z
n), (6)
I(Zn,W2) = H(W2)−H(W2|Z
n), (7)
2
and
I(Zn, (W1,W2)) = H(W1,W2)−H(W1,W2|Z
n). (8)
Perfect secrecy revolves around the idea that the eavesdropper cannot get even a single bit information about the transmitted
messages. Perfect secrecy thus requires that
I(Zn,W1) = 0⇔ H(W1) = H(W1|Z
n), (9)
I(Zn,W2) = 0⇔ H(W2) = H(W2|Z
n),
and
I(Zn, (W1,W2)) = 0⇔ H(W1,W2) = H(W1,W2|Z
n). (10)
The secrecy levels of confidential messages W1 and W2 are measured at the eavesdropper in terms of equivocation rates which
are defined as follows.
Definition 1 The equivocation rates Re1, Re2 and Re12 for the Broadcast channel with confidential messages are:
Re1 =
1
n
H(W1|Z
n), (11)
Re2 =
1
n
H(W2|Z
n),
Re12 =
1
n
H(W1,W2|Z
n).
The perfect secrecy rates R1 and R2 are the amount of information that can be sent to the legitimate receivers not only reliably
but also confidentially.
Definition 2 A secrecy rate pair (R1, R2) is said to be achievable if for any ǫ > 0, there exists a sequence of ((2nR1 , 2nR2), n)
codes, such that for sufficiently large n, we have:
P (n)e ≤ ǫ, (12)
Re1≥ R1 − ǫ1, (13)
Re2≥ R2 − ǫ2, (14)
Re12≥ R1 +R2 − ǫ3. (15)
In the above definition, the first condition concerns the reliability, while the other conditions guarantee perfect secrecy for each
individual message and both messages as well. The capacity region is defined as follows.
Definition 3 The capacity region of the broadcast channel with confidential messages is the closure of the set of all achievable
rate pairs (R1, R2).
III. GENERAL BCCS
In this section, we consider the general broadcast channel with confidential messages and present an achievable rate region.
Our achievable coding scheme is based on a combination of the random binning and the Gelfand-Pinsker bining schemes [32].
The following theorem illustrates the achievable rate region for this channel.
Theorem 1 Let RI denote the union of all non-negative rate pairs (R1, R2) satisfying
R1≤ I(V1;Y1)− I(V1;Z), (16)
R2≤ I(V2;Y2)− I(V2;Z), (17)
R1 +R2≤ I(V1;Y1) + I(V2;Y2)− I(V1, V2;Z)− I(V1;V2). (18)
over all joint distributions P (v1, v2)P (x|v1, v2)P (y1, y2, z|x). Then any rate pair (R1, R2) ∈ RI is achievable for the broadcast
channel with confidential messages.
Remark 1 If we remove the secrecy constraints by setting Z = ∅, then the above rate region reduces to Marton’s achievable
region for the general broadcast channel.
Remark 2 If we remove one of the users by setting e.g., Y2 = ∅, then we get the Csiszar and Korner’s secrecy capacity for
the other user.
Proof:
3
12
1
2
.
.
.
2nR2
.
.
.
· · ·· · ·
2nR1
(Vn1 , V
n
2 ) ∈ A
(n)
ǫ
Fig. 2. The Stochastic Encoder
1) Codebook Generation: The structure of the encoder is depicted in Fig.2. Fix P (v1), P (v2) and P (x|v1, v2). The stochastic
encoder generates 2n(I(V1;Y1)−ǫ) independent and identically distributed sequences vn1 according to the distribution P (vn1 ) =∏n
i=1 P (v1,i). Next, randomly distribute these sequences into 2nR1 bins such that each bin contains 2n(I(V1;Z)−ǫ) codewords.
Similarly, it generates 2n(I(V2;Y2)−ǫ) independent and identically distributed sequences vn2 according to the distribution P (vn2 ) =∏n
i=1 P (v2,i). Next, randomly distribute these sequences into 2nR2 bins such that each bin contains 2n(I(V2;Z)−ǫ) codewords.
Index each of the above bins by w1 ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2nR1} and w2 ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2nR2} respectively.
2) Encoding: To send messages w1 and w2, the transmitter looks for vn1 in bin w1 of the first bin set and looks for vn2 in bin
w2 of the second bin set, such that (vn1 , vn2 ) ∈ A
(n)
ǫ (PV1,V2) where A
(n)
ǫ (PV1,V2) denotes the set of jointly typical sequences vn1
and vn2 with respect to P (v1, v2). The rates are such that there exist more than one joint typical pair, the transmitter randomly
chooses one of them and then generates xn according to P (xn|vn1 , vn2 ) =
∏n
i=1 P (xi|v1,i, v2,i). This scheme is equivalent to
the scenario in which each bin is divided into subbins and the transmitter randomly chooses one of the subbins of bin w1 and
one of the subbins of bin w2. It then looks for a joint typical sequence (vn1 , vn2 ) in the corresponding subbins and generates
xn.
3) Decoding: The received signals at the legitimate receivers, yn1 and yn2 , are the outputs of the channels P (yn1 |xn) =∏n
i=1 P (y1,i|xi) and P (yn2 |xn) =
∏n
i=1 P (y2,i|xi), respectively. The first receiver looks for the unique sequence vn1 such that
(vn1 , y
n
1 ) is jointly typical and declares the index of the bin containing vn1 as the message received. The second receiver uses
the same method to extract the message w2.
4) Error Probability Analysis: Since the region of (12) is a subset of Marton’s region then, error probability analysis is the
same as [33].
5) Equivocation Calculation: The proof of secrecy requirement for each individual message (13) and (14) is straightforward
and may therefore be omitted.
To prove the requirement of (15) consider H(W1,W2|Zn), we have
nRe12 = H(W1,W2|Z
n)
≥ H(W1,W2, Z
n)−H(Zn)
= H(W1,W2, V1n , V
n
2 , Z
n)−H(V n1 , V
n
2 |W1,W2, Z
n)−H(Zn)
= H(W1,W2, V
n
1 , V
n
2 ) +H(Z
n|W1,W2, V
n
1 , V
n
2 )−H(V
n
1 , V
n
2 |W1,W2, Z
n)−H(Zn)
(a)
≥ H(W1,W2, V
n
1 , V
n
2 ) +H(Z
n|W1,W2, V
n
1 , V
n
2 )− nǫn −H(Z
n)
(b)
= H(W1,W2, V
n
1 , V
n
2 ) +H(Z|V
n
1 , V
n
2 )− nǫn −H(Z
n)
(c)
≥ H(V n1 , V
n
2 ) +H(Z
n|V n1 , V
n
2 )− nǫn −H(Z
n)
(d)
= H(V n1 ) +H(V
n
2 )− I(V
n
1 ;V
n
2 )− I(V
n
1 , V
n
2 ;Z
n)− nǫn
(e)
= I(V n1 ;Y
n
1 ) + I(V
n
2 ;Y
n
2 )− I(V
n
1 ;V
n
2 )− I(V
n
1 , V
n
2 ;Z
n)− nǫn
≥ nR1 + nR2 − nǫn,
where (a) follows from Fano’s inequality which states that for sufficiently large n we have H(V n1 , V n2 |W1,W2, Zn)
≤ h(P
(n)
we ) +nPnweI(V1, V2;Z) ≤ nǫn. Here Pnwe denotes the wiretapper’s error probability of decoding (vn1 , vn2 ) in the
4
case that the bin numbers w1 and w2 are known to the eavesdropper. Since the sum rate is less than I(V1, V2;Z), then
Pnwe → 0 for sufficiently large n. (b) follows from the following Markov chain: (W1,W2)→ (V1, V2)→ Z . Hence, we have
H(Zn|W1,W2, V n1 , V
n
2 ) = H(Z
n|V n1 , V
n
2 ). (c) follows from the fact that H(W1,W2, V n1 , V n2 ) ≥ H(V n1 , V n2 ). (d) follows
from that fact that H(V n1 ) = I(V n1 ;Y n1 ) and H(V n2 ) = I(V n2 ;Y n2 ).
IV. THE SECRECY CAPACITY REGION OF THE DEGRADED BCCS
In this section, we consider the degraded broadcast channel with confidential messages and establish its secrecy capacity
region.
Definition 4 A broadcast channel with confidential messages is said to be physically degraded, if X → Y1 → Y2 → Z forms
a Markov chain. In the other words, we have
P (y1, y2, z|x) = P (y1|x)P (y2|y1)P (z|y2). (19)
Definition 5 A broadcast channel with confidential messages is said to be stochastically degraded if its conditional marginal
distributions are the same as that of a physically degraded broadcast channel, i.e., if there exist two distributions P ′(y2|y1)
and P ′(z|y2) such that
P (y2|x) =
∑
y1
P (y1|x)P
′
(y2|y1) (20)
P (z|x) =
∑
y2
P (y2|x)P
′
(z|y2)
Lemma 1 The secrecy capacity region of a broadcast channel with confidential messages depends only on the conditional
marginal distributions P (y1|x), P (y2|x) and P (z|x).
Proof: The proof is very similar to [34] and may therefore be omitted here.
In the following theorem, we fully characterize the capacity region of the physically degraded broadcast channel with confidential
messages.
Theorem 2 The capacity region for transmitting independent secret information over the degraded broadcast channel is the
convex hull of the closure of all (R1, R2) satisfying
R1≤ I(X ;Y1|U) + I(U ;Z)− I(X ;Z), (21)
R2≤ I(U ;Y2)− I(U ;Z). (22)
for some joint distribution P (u)P (x|u)P (y1, y2, z|x).
Remark 3 If we remove the secrecy constraints by setting Z = ∅, then the above theorem reduces to the capacity region of
the degraded broadcast channel.
Proof:
Achievability: The coding scheme is based on Cover’s superposition coding and the random bining. We refer to this scheme
as Secure Superposition Coding scheme. The available resources at the encoder are used for two purposes: to confuse the
eavesdropper so that perfect secrecy can be achieved for both layers, and to transmit the messages in the main channels. To
satisfy confidentiality, the randomization used in the first layer is again used in the second layer. This makes a shift of I(U ;Z)
in the bound of R1. The formal proof of the achievability is as follows:
1) Codebook Generation: The structure of the encoder is depicted in Fig.3. Let us fix P (u) and P (x|u). The stochastic
encoder generates 2n(I(U ;Y2)−ǫ) independent and identically distributed sequences un according to the distribution P (un) =∏n
i=1 P (ui). Next, we randomly distribute these sequences into 2nR2 bins such that each bin contains 2n(I(U ;Z)−ǫ) codewords.
We index each of the above bins by w2 ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2nR2}. For each codeword of un, it also generates 2n(I(X;Y1|U)−ǫ)
independent and identically distributed sequences xn according to the distribution P (xn|un) =
∏n
i=1 P (xi|ui). We randomly
distribute these sequences into 2nR1 bins such that each bin contains 2n(I(X;Z)−I(U ;Z)−ǫ) codewords. We index each of the
above bins by w1 ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2nR1}.
2) Encoding: To send messages w1 and w2, the transmitter randomly chooses one of the codewords in bin w2, say un. Then
given un, the transmitter randomly chooses one of xn in bin w1 of the second layer and sends it.
3) Decoding: The received signal at the legitimate receivers, yn1 and yn2 , are the outputs of the channels P (yn1 |xn) =∏n
i=1 P (y1,i|xi) and P (yn2 |xn) =
∏n
i=1 P (y2,i|xi), respectively. Receiver 2 determines the unique un such that (un, yn2 ) are
jointly typical and declares the index of the bin containing un as the message received. If there is none of such or more than of
5
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Fig. 3. Secret Superposition structure
one such, an error is declared. Receiver 1 looks for the unique (un, xn) such that (un, xn, yn1 ) are jointly typical and declares
the indexes of the bins containing un and xn as the messages received. If there is none of such or more than of one such, an
error is declared.
4) Error Probability Analysis: Since each rate pair of (21) is in the capacity region of the degraded broadcast channel without
confidentiality constraint, then it can be readily shown that the error probability is arbitrarily small, c.f. [34].
5) Equivocation Calculation: To prove the secrecy requirement of (13), we have
nRe1 = H(W1|Z
n)
≥ H(W1|Z
n, Un)
= H(W1, Z
n|Un)−H(Zn|Un)
= H(W1, X
n, Zn|Un)−H(Zn|Un)−H(Xn|W1, Z
n, Un)
(a)
= H(W1, X
n|Un) +H(Zn|W1, U
n, Xn)−H(Zn|Un)− nǫn
(b)
≥ H(Xn|Un) +H(Zn|Xn)−H(Zn|Un)− nǫn
(c)
= H(Xn;Y n1 |U
n) + I(Un;Zn)− I(Xn;Zn)− nǫn
≥ nR1 − nǫn,
where (a) follows from Fano’s inequality which states that H(Xn|W1, Zn, Un) ≤ h(P (n)we ) + nPnweI(X ;Z) ≤ nǫn for
sufficiently large n. Here Pnwe denotes the wiretapper’s error probability of decoding xn given the bin number and the codeword
un are known to the eavesdropper. Since the rate is less than I(X ;Z), then Pnwe → 0 for sufficiently large n. (b) follows
from the fact that (W1, U) → X → Z forms a Markov chain. Thus we have I(W1, Un;Zn|Xn) = 0, where it is implied
that H(Zn|W1, Un, Xn) = H(Zn|Xn). (c) follows from two identities: H(Xn|Un) = I(Xn;Y n1 |Un) and H(Zn|Xn) −
H(Zn|Un) = I(Un;Zn) − I(Xn;Zn). Since the proof of the requirement (14) is straightforward, we need to prove the
requirement of (15).
nRe12 = H(W1,W2|Z
n)
≥ H(W1,W2, Z
n)−H(Zn)
= H(W1,W2, U
n, Xn, Zn)−H(Un, Xn|W1,W2, Z
n)−H(Zn)
= H(W1,W2, U
n, Xn)
+ H(Zn|W1,W2, U
n, Xn)−H(Un, Xn|W1,W2, Z
n)−H(Zn)
(a)
≥ H(W1,W2, U
n, Xn) +H(Zn|W1,W2, U
n, Xn)− nǫn −H(Z
n)
(b)
= H(W1,W2, U
n, Xn) +H(Z|Un, Xn)− nǫn −H(Z
n)
(c)
≥ H(Un, Xn) +H(Zn|Un, Xn)− nǫn −H(Z
n)
= H(Un) +H(Xn|Un)− I(Un, Xn;Zn)− nǫn
(d)
= I(Un;Y n2 ) + I(X
n;Y n1 |U
n)− I(Xn;Zn)− I(Un;Zn|Xn)− nǫn
≥ nR1 + nR2 − nǫn,
6
where (a) follows from Fano’s inequality that H(Un, Xn|W1,W2, Zn) ≤ h(P (n)we ) + nPnweI(U,X ;Z) ≤ nǫn for sufficiently
large n. Here Pnwe denotes the wiretapper’s error probability of decoding (un, xn) in the case that the bin numbers w1 and
w2 are known to the eavesdropper. The eavesdropper first looks for the unique un in bin w2 of the first layer, such that it
is jointly typical with zn. Since the number of candidate codewords is less than I(U ;Z), then the probability of error is
arbitrarily small for a sufficiently large n. Next, given un, the eavesdropper looks for the unique xn in bin w1 which is jointly
typical with zn. Similarly, since the number of available candidates is less than I(X ;Z), then the probability of error decoding
is arbitrarily small. (b) follows from the fact that (W1,W2) → U → X → Z forms a Markov chain. Therefore, we have
I(W1,W2;Z
n|Un, Xn) = 0, where it is implied that H(Zn|W1,W2, Un, Xn) = H(Zn|Un, Xn). (c) follows from the fact that
H(W1,W2, U
n, Xn) ≥ H(Un, Xn). (d) follows from that fact that H(Un) = I(Un;Y n2 ) and H(Xn|Un) = I(Xn;Y n1 |Un).
Converse: The transmitter sends two independent secret messages W1 and W2 to receiver 1 and receiver 2 respectively. Let
us define Ui = (W2, Y i−11 ). The following chain of inequality clarifies the proof:
nR1
(a)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(W1;Y1,i|W2, Zi, Y
i−1
1 , Z˜
i+1) + nδ1 + nǫ3
=
n∑
i=1
I(W1;Y1,i|Ui, Zi, Z˜
i+1) + nδ1 + nǫ3
(b)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y1,i|Ui, Zi, Z˜
i+1) + nδ1 + nǫ3
(c)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y1,i, Ui, Zi|Z˜
i+1)− I(Xi;Zi|Z˜
i+1)− I(Xi;Ui|Zi, Z˜
i+1) + nδ1 + nǫ3
(d)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y1,i|Ui, Z˜
i+1) + I(Xi;Ui|Z˜
i+1)− I(Xi;Zi|Z˜
i+1)− I(Xi;Ui|Zi, Z˜
i+1) + nδ1 + nǫ3
(e)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y1,i|Ui, Z˜
i+1)− I(Xi;Zi|Z˜
i+1) + I(Zi;Ui|Z˜
i+1)− I(Zi;Ui|Xi, Z˜
i+1) + nδ1 + nǫ3
(f)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y1,i|Ui, Z˜
i+1)− I(Xi;Zi|Z˜
i+1) + I(Zi;Ui|Z˜
i+1) + nδ1 + nǫ3
,
(a) follows from the following lemma (2). (b) follows from the data processing theorem. (c) follows from the chain rule. (d)
follows from the fact that I(Xi;Y1,i, Ui, Zi|Z˜i+1) = I(Xi;Ui|Z˜i+1)+I(Xi;Y1,i|Ui, Z˜i+1)+I(Xi;Zi|Y1,i, Ui, Z˜i+1) and from
the fact that Z˜i+1Ui → Xi → Y1,i → Y2,i → Zi forms a Markov chain, which means that I(Xi;Zi|Y1,i, Ui, Z˜i+1) = 0. (e)
follows from the fact that I(Xi;Ui|Z˜i+1)− I(Xi;Ui|Zi, Z˜i+1) = I(Zi;Ui|Z˜i+1)− I(Zi;Ui|Xi, Z˜i+1). (f) follows from the
fact that Z˜i+1Ui → Xi → Zi forms a Markov chain. Thus I(Zi;UiZ˜i+1|Xi) = 0 which implies that I(Zi;Ui|Xi, Z˜i+1) = 0.
Lemma 2 : For the broadcast channel with confidential messages of (W1,W2)→ Xn → Y n1 Y n2 Zn, the perfect secrecy rates
are bounded as follows,
nR1≤
n∑
i=1
I(W1;Y1i|W2, Zi, Y
i−1
1 , Z˜
i+1) + nδ1 + nǫ3, (23)
nR2≤
n∑
i=1
I(W2;Y2i|Zi, Y
i−1
2 , Z˜
i+1) + nδ1 + nǫ2. (24)
Proof: We need to prove the first bound. The second bound can similarly be proven. According to the above discussion
nR1 is bounded as follows:
nR1
(a)
≤ H(W1|W2, Z
n) + nǫ3
(b)
≤ H(W1|W2, Z
n)−H(W1|Y
n
1 ,W2) + nδ1 + nǫ3
= I(W1;Y
n
1 |W2)− I(W1;Z
n|W2) + nδ1 + nǫ3
where (a) follows from the secrecy constraint that H(W1,W2|Zn) ≥ H(W1,W2)− nǫ3, the fact that H(W2|Zn) ≤ H(W2)
and the fact that two messages are independent. (b) follows from Fano’s inequality that H(W1|Y n1 ,W2) ≤ nδ1. Next, we
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expand I(W1;Y n1 |W2) and I(W1;Zn|W2) starting with I(W1;Y1|W2) and I(W1; Z˜n|W2), respectively.
I(W1;Y
n
1 |W2) =
n∑
i=1
I(W1;Y1i|W2, Y
i−1
1 )
=
n∑
i=1
I(W1, Z˜
i+1;Y1i|W2, Y
i−1
1 )− I(Z˜
i+1;Y1i|W1,W2, Y
i−1
1 )
=
n∑
i=1
I(W1;Y1i|W2, Y
i−1
1 , Z˜
i+1) + I(Z˜i+1;Y1i|W2, Y
i−1
1 )− I(Z˜
i+1;Y1i|W1,W2, Y
i−1
1 )
=
n∑
i=1
I(W1;Y1i|W2, Y
i−1
1 , Z˜
i+1) + ∆1 −∆2,
where, ∆1 =
∑n
i=1 I(Z˜
i+1;Y1i|W2, Y
i−1
1 ) and ∆2 =
∑n
i=1 I(Z˜
i+1;Y1i|W1,W2, Y
i−1
1 ). Similarly, we have,
I(W1;Z
n|W2) =
n∑
i=1
I(W1;Zi|W2, Z˜
i+1)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W1, Y
i−1
1 ;Zi|W2, Z˜
i+1)− I(Y i−11 ;Zi|W1,W2, Z˜
i+1)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W1;Zi|W2, Y
i−1
1 , Z˜
i+1) + I(Y i−11 ;Zi|W2, Z˜
i+1)− I(Y i−11 ;Zi|W1,W2, Z˜
i+1)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W1;Zi|W2, Y
i−1
1 , Z˜
i+1) + ∆∗1 −∆
∗
2,
where, ∆∗1 =
∑n
i=1 I(Y
i−1
1 ;Zi|W2, Z˜
i+1) and ∆∗2 =
∑n
i=1 I(Y
i−1
1 ;Zi|W1,W2, Z˜
i+1). According to lemma 7 of [4], ∆1 = ∆∗1
and ∆2 = ∆∗2. Thus, we have,
nR1 ≤
n∑
i=1
I(W1;Y1i|W2, Y
i−1
1 , Z˜
i+1)− I(W1;Zi|W2, Y
i−1
1 , Z˜
i+1) + nδ1 + nǫ3
=
n∑
i=1
H(W1|W2, Zi, Y
i−1
1 , Z˜
i+1)−H(W1|W2, Y1i, Y
i−1
1 , Z˜
i+1) + nδ1 + nǫ3
(a)
≤
n∑
i=1
H(W1|W2, Zi, Y
i−1
1 , Z˜
i+1)−H(W1|W2, Y1i, Zi, Y
i−1
1 , Z˜
i+1) + nδ1 + nǫ3
=
n∑
i=1
I(W1;Y1i|W2, Zi, Y
i−1
1 , Z˜
i+1) + nδ1 + nǫ3,
where (a) follows from the fact that conditioning always decreases the entropy.
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For the second receiver, we have
nR2
(a)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(W2;Y2,i|Y
i−1
2 , Zi, Z˜
i+1) + nδ2 + nǫ1
=
n∑
i=1
H(Y2,i|Y
i−1
2 , Zi, Z˜
i+1)−H(Y2,i|W2, Y
i−1
2 , Zi, Z˜
i+1) + nδ2 + nǫ1
(b)
≤
n∑
i=1
H(Y2,i|Zi, Z˜
i+1)−H(Y2,i|W2, Y
i−1
1 , Y
i−1
2 , Zi, Z˜
i+1) + nδ2 + nǫ1
(c)
=
n∑
i=1
H(Y2,i|Zi, Z˜
i+1)−H(Y2,i|Ui, Zi, Z˜
i+1) + nδ2 + nǫ1
=
n∑
i=1
I(Y2,i;Ui|Zi, Z˜
i+1) + nδ2 + nǫ1
=
n∑
i=1
I(Y2,i;Ui|Z˜
i+1) + I(Y2,i;Zi|Ui, Z˜
i+1)− I(Y2,i;Zi|Z˜
i+1) + nδ2 + nǫ1
=
n∑
i=1
I(Y2,i;Ui|Z˜
i+1)− I(Zi;Ui|Z˜
i+1) + I(Zi;Ui|Y2,i, Z˜
i+1) + nδ2 + nǫ1
(d)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Y2,i;Ui|Z˜
i+1)− I(Zi;Ui|Z˜
i+1) + nδ2 + nǫ1,
where (a) follows from the lemma (2). (b) follows from the fact that conditioning always decreases the entropy. (c) follows
from the fact that Y i−12 → W2Z˜i+1Y
i−1
1 → Y2i → Zi forms a Markov chain. (d) follows from the fact that Z˜i+1Ui →
Y2,i → Zi forms a Markov chain. Thus I(Zi;UiZ˜i+1|Y2i) = 0 which implies that I(Zi;Ui|Y2i, Z˜i+1) = 0. Now, following
[34], let us define the time sharing random variable Q which is uniformly distributed over {1, 2, ..., n} and independent of
(W1,W2, X
n, Y n1 , Y
n
2 ). Let us define U = UQ, V = (Z˜Q+1, Q), X = XQ, Y1 = Y1,Q, Y2 = Y2,Q, Z = ZQ, then we can
bound R1 and R2 as follows
R1≤ I(X ;Y1|U, V ) + I(U ;Z|V )− I(X ;Z|V ), (25)
R2≤ I(U ;Y2|V )− I(U ;Z|V ). (26)
Since Conditional mutual informations are average of unconditional ones, the maximum region is achieved when V is a
constant. This proves the converse part.
V. GAUSSIAN BCCS
In this section we consider the physically degraded AWGN broadcast channel with confidential messages. We show that secret
superposition coding with Gaussian codebook is optimal. At time i the received signals are Y1i = Xi+n1i, Y2i = Xi+n2i and
Zi = Xi + n3i, where n1i’s, n2i’s and n3i’s are each independent identically distributed Gaussian random variables with zero
means and V ar(nji) = Nj , j=1,2,3. All noises are independent of Xi and N1 ≤ N2 ≤ N3. Assume that transmitted power is
limited to E[X2] ≤ P . Since the channels are degraded, at time i, Y1i = Xi+n1i, Y2i = Y1i+n
′
2i and Zi = Y2i+n
′
3i, where
n1i’s are i.i.d N (0, N1), n
′
2i’s are i.i.d N (0, N1−N2), and n
′
3i’s are i.i.d N (0, N2−N3). Fig.4 shows the equivalent channels
for the physically degraded AWGN-BCCs. The following theorem illustrates the secrecy capacity region of AWGN-BCCs.
Theorem 3 The secrecy capacity region of the AWGN broadcast channel with confidential messages is given by the set of
rates pairs (R1, R2) such that
R1≤ C
(
αP
N1
)
+ C
(
(1 − α)P
αP +N3
)
− C
(
P
N3
)
, (27)
R2≤ C
(
(1 − α)P
αP +N2
)
− C
(
(1− α)P
αP +N3
)
. (28)
for some α ∈ [0, 1].
Proof:
Achievability: Let U ∼ N (0, (1 − α)P ) and X ′ ∼ N (0, αP ) be independent and X = U + X ′ ∼ N (0, P ). Therefore,
the amount of I(X ;Y1|U), I(U ;Z), I(X ;Z), and I(U ;Y2) can be easily evaluated. Now consider the following secure
superposition coding scheme:
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Fig. 4. equivalent channels for the AWGN-BCCs
1) Codebook Generation: Generate 2nI(U ;Y2) i.i.d Gaussian codewords un with average power (1 − α)P and randomly
distribute these codewords into 2nR2 bins. Then index each bin by w2 ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2nR2}. Generate an independent set of
2nI(X
′
;Y1) i.i.d Gaussian codewords x′n with average power αP . Then, Randomly distribute them into 2nR1 bins. Index each
bin by w1 ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2nR1}.
2) Encoding: To send messages w1 and w2, the transmitter randomly chooses one of the codewords in bin w2, (say un) and
one of the codewords in bin w1 (say x′n ). Then, simply transmits xn = un + x′n.
3) Decoding: The received signal at the legitimate receivers are yn1 and yn2 respectively. Receiver 2 determines the unique
un such that (un, yn2 ) are jointly typical and declares the index of the bin containing un as the message received. If there is
none of such or more than of one such, an error is declared. Receiver 1 uses successive cancelation method; first decodes un
and subtracts off yn1 and then looks for the unique x
′n such that (x′n, yn1 ) are jointly typical and declares the indexes of the
bin containing x′n as the message received.
The error probability analysis and equivocation calculation is straightforward and may therefor be omitted.
Converse: According to the previous section, R2 is bounded as follows:
R2 ≤ I(Y2;U |Z) = H(Y2|Z)−H(Y2|U,Z) (29)
The classical entropy power inequality states that:
2
2
n
H(Y2+n
′
3
) ≥ 2
2
n
H(Y2) + 2
2
n
H(n
′
3
)
Therefore, H(Y2|Z) can be written as follows:
H(Y2|Z) = H(Z|Y2) +H(Y2)−H(Z)
=
n
2
log(N3 −N2) +H(Y2)−H(Y2 + n
′
3)
≤
n
2
log(N3 −N2) +H(Y2)−
n
2
log(2
2
n
H(Y2) +N3 −N2)
On the other hand, for any fixed a ∈ R, the function
f(t, a) = t−
n
2
log(2
2
n
t + a)
is concave in t and has a global maximum at t = tmax. Thus, H(Y2|Z) is maximized when Y2 (or equivalently X) has
Gaussian distribution. Hence,
H(Y2|Z) ≤
n
2
log(N3 −N2) +
n
2
log(P +N2)−
n
2
log(P +N3) (30)
=
n
2
log
(
(N3 −N2)(P +N2)
P +N3
)
Now consider the term H(Y2|U,Z). This term is lower bounded with H(Y2|U,X,Z) = n2 log(N2) which is greater than
n
2 log(
N2(N3−N2)
N3
). Hence,
n
2
log(
N2(N3 −N2)
N3
) ≤ H(Y2|U,Z) ≤ H(Y2|Z) (31)
Inequalities (30) and (31) imply that there exists a α ∈ [0, 1] such that
H(Y2|U,Z) =
n
2
log
(
(N3 −N2)(αP +N2)
αP +N3
)
(32)
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Substituting (32) and (30) into (29) yields the desired bound
R2 ≤ H(Y2|Z)−H(Y2|U,Z) (33)
≤
n
2
log
(
(P +N2)(αP +N3)
(P +N3)(αP +N2)
)
= C
(
(1− α)P
αP +N2
)
− C
(
(1 − α)P
αP +N3
)
To bound the rate R1, we need the following generalized entropy power inequality which is proven in [35].
Lemma 3 [35]: Let n1, n2 be two gaussian random variables. Let U be a random variable independent of n1 and n2.
Consider The optimization problem
max
P (X|U)
H(X + n1|U)−H(X + n2|U) (34)
subject to V ar(X |U) ≤ s (35)
where the maximization is over all distribution of X given U independent of n1 and n2. A Gaussian P (x|u) with same variance
for each u is an optimal solution for this optimization problem.
The rate R1 is bounded as follows
R1 ≤ I(X ;Y1|U)− I(X ;Z) + I(U ;Z) (36)
= H(Y1|U)−H(Y1|X,U) +H(Z|X)−H(Z|U)
= H(Y1|U)−H(Z|U) +
n
2
log(
N3
N1
)
= H(X + n1|U)−H(X + n3|U) +
n
2
log(
N3
N1
)
On the other hand using (32), when Z = 0 and n2 = 0 then V ar(X |U) = αP . Therefore, According to the above lemma the
Gaussian distribution is optimum and R1 is bounded as
R1 ≤
n
2
log
(
αP +N1
αP +N3
N3
N1
)
(37)
= C
(
αP
N1
)
+ C
(
(1− α)P
αP +N3
)
− C
(
P
N3
)
VI. CONCLUSION
A generalization of the wire-tap channel to the case of two receivers and one eavesdropper is considered. We established an
inner bound for the general (non-degraded) case. This bound matches Marton’s bound on broadcast channels without security
constraint. Furthermore, we considered the scenario in which the channels are degraded. We established the perfect secrecy
capacity region for this case. The achievability coding scheme is a secret superposition scheme where randomization in the
first layer helps the secrecy of the second layer. The converse proof combines the converse proof for the degraded broadcast
channel without security constraint and the perfect secrecy constraint. We proved that the secret superposition scheme with
Gaussian codebook is optimal in AWGN-BCCs. The converse proof is based on the generalized entropy power inequality and
Csiszar lemma.
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